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Abstract 
We address the issue of intellectual property (IP) rights in onshore and offshore software 
development outsourcing. IP assets are generally intangible in nature and are easily 
misappropriated by the contracting parties. The paper examines two IP protection mechanisms 
employed by firms: rights-sharing arrangements and restrictive covenants and using data from 153 
software contracts across 14 countries we show how IP protection mechanisms are related to 
software customization, software modularity, pricing scheme, and to the strength of the overall IP 
legal protection environment in the vendor countries.   
Keywords:  Intellectual property, software development agreement, IT outsourcing 
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Introduction 
Outsourcing of software development represents an increasingly important business activity for firms, and a critical 
byproduct of these transactions involves the transfer of intellectual property (IP) between the clients and the 
vendors. Among the various types of intellectual property that are typically transferred in software development are 
design specifications, existing software that is the basis for further development, process descriptions for new 
development, and other instructions that provide an understanding not obvious from the primary materials shared 
between the client and the vendor (Wiederhold et al. 2008).  
Intellectual property is defined as the intangible knowledge component embedded in the software and the common 
means for protecting intangible property are copyright, trademarks, patents and trade secrets. In cases where the 
vendor is permitted to resell the software in the new market, the vendor will oftentimes be granted additional rights 
to use established trademarks along with trade secrets that describe business methods that make the sales effective 
and instructions on exploiting the business methods (Wiederhold et al. 2008). Some recent cases of offshore 
software work have also witnessed the movement of sensitive customer data such as social security identifiers, bank 
account information, medical history, and tax records from clients to overseas vendor companies. In addition, the 
emerging trend of patenting software also adds complexity to the IP management between outsourcing vendors and 
clients.  
Common IP protection mechanisms employed by companies engaged in software outsourcing include copyright, 
licensing, trademarks, patents, and trade secrets. In cases involving direct sales of software, copyright serves as the 
major means of protection, even though enforcing copyrights, especially outside the country of origin remains hard 
(Johns 2002). Software licensing, rather than outright sales, is therefore often used by companies to retain property 
rights over the software asset. Trademarks provide another common protection mechanism and are relatively more 
easily defended as their misuse is more visible (Weiderhold et al. 2008). Software patents are not universally granted 
by countries
1
 and are relatively harder to obtain since patents require proof of novelty, which is much harder to 
establish in software products. Finally, the intangible knowledge that is shared about the software product is 
protected through trade secrets enforced by requiring the vendor company representatives to sign NDA (non-
disclosure) agreements protecting the confidentiality of the knowledge gained.  
Despite the myriad protection mechanisms, theft of source code and misappropriation of trade secrets and 
proprietary data continue to be major risks in software outsourcing (Wiederhold et al. 2008). In addition, many 
companies also fear the loss of competitive advantage through negative knowledge spillovers that can occur when 
software vendors gain access to client’s proprietary knowledge which then makes its way to the client’s competitors. 
As noted earlier, proprietary information contained in software products are typically not protected under copyright 
or patent law and trade secret law often offers the only protection. However, to prevail in a case of misappropriation 
of trade secrets, a plaintiff must show (a) the existence of a trade secret; (b) that reasonable steps were taken to 
preserve secrecy, and (c) that the defendants used or continued to use improper means in breach of a confidential 
relationship to acquire the secret
2
. Third-party independent reviews of the software and associated trade secrets are 
often needed to support the claims and this requires the cooperation of both the plaintiff and the defendant. Even 
when cases reach the courts, IP litigation involves lengthy trial time. In the software industry, the length of the trial 
relative to the pace of technology allows competitors to develop next-generation products based on the existing code 
and, ultimately, overtake the innovators (Imparato 1999). When software development tasks are offshored, IP 
litigation is further complicated due to differential laws across countries. For example, unlike most other countries, 
the United States uses a first-to-invent patent system instead of a first-to-file system. Even the duration of patent 
protection varies across countries, ranging from five years in some Latin American countries to 20 years in most 
European countries (Christie and Rotstein 2007). For copyright, different from the default “work-made-for-hire” 
rule in the U.S., Indian copyright law requires that assignment of copyright is in writing by employees. In addition, 
the term of copyright in India is shorter than in the U.S. Offshore software work sent to India should therefore 
specify a fixed term of protection to ensure the largest grant of rights possible under Indian law.  
 
                                                           
1
 Although software patents are granted in US, some European countries, South Korea, and Japan, the patentable subject matter and types of 
software to be patentable are different across those countries.  
2 See Data Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp. 36 F.3d 1147, 1165 (1st Cir. 1994) 
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In addition to these differences, the effectiveness of legal enforcement in offshore countries has raised a lot concerns 
in recent years. Some countries (e.g., India, China and Hungary) have copyright or patent law which protects 
computer programs; however, these countries do not have the enforcement infrastructure needed to effectively 
implement that protection
3
.  
 
Given the IP risks and the difficulty in IP litigation, companies resort to approaches aimed at managing IP 
misappropriation risks through appropriate project design (e.g., project modularity), incentive mechanism (e.g., 
revenue sharing), or contractual protection (e.g., IP rights sharing and restrictive covenants). However, little is 
known about how these choices are made, what factors influence the rights sharing agreements between parties, and 
whether modularized design and contractual protection act as substitutes or complements for protecting intangible 
knowledge assets in software development outsourcing. The current paper draws on property rights theory 
(Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore 1990) to examine these issues using a dataset of 153 software 
development agreements (108 domestic and 45 offshore) across 14 countries. The study makes some important 
contributions. Most importantly, the study enriches our limited understanding of IP misappropriation risk 
management in outsourcing contexts. This research is among the first group of empirical studies to explore 
misappropriation risk reduction approaches. Second, through extensive content analysis on software development 
agreements, the study identifies general IP ownership allocation and right sharing schemes in IT outsourcing 
context. It enriches our understanding on the complexity of IP rights and how firms use contractual mechanisms to 
mitigate the risks. Third, the research provides important insights into when companies are likely to use rights-
sharing and restrictive covenants to control IP assets given the outsourced project attributes. It provides guidelines 
for practitioners on how to manage software development projects to mitigate the inevitable IP risks.  
Intellectual Property Ownership and Rights Sharing  
In software development contracts, confidential information and trade secrets are difficult to clearly define and 
misappropriation of these IP assets is largely unforeseeable (Clemons and Hitt 2004; Walden 2005). The contracts 
therefore tend to be incomplete and additional safeguards to circumvent potential hold-ups become necessary. 
Property rights theory (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990) proposes ownership allocation as an 
alternative mechanism to help address the incompleteness of the contract. The theory predicts that when allocated 
efficiently, the incentives provided by property asset ownership will reduce various hold-up costs (Holmstrom and 
Milgrom 1994; Holmstrom 1999). The Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights framework proposes that property 
rights in a bilateral relationship should be owned by the party whose effort is most critical to the success of the 
agreement. The framework was extended to information assets by Brynjolfsson (1994), who proposes that agents 
who develop inalienable information or know-how should also own the complementary property rights. Following 
this framework, Walden (2005) derives the optimal IP rights-sharing strategy in software outsourcing and suggests 
that clients should allocate vendors some share of the client’s net usage benefit via ownership in case where 
information poaching and negative knowledge spillover effects are likely.  
 
There are two contractual approaches to allocate property rights: IP rights-sharing and restrictive covenants. IP 
rights-sharing allocates the IP asset value, such as ownership, and use rights between partners, while restrictive 
covenants are used to limit partners’ ability to unfairly profit from the relationship. Rights sharing arrangements can 
be worked out in five different ways: (1) the client owns the sole and exclusive property of the software deliverables 
and derivatives (work-made-for-hire approach); (2) the client allocates to the vendor some IP rights (e.g., patent 
application right for the developed software, or both parties share ownership of the inventions derived from the 
software development process while the client owns the sole ownership of other kinds of IP rights, etc.); (3) the 
client and vendor jointly own the developed intellectual properties in the contract; (4) the vendor owns the full 
ownership of the developed software and derivatives but grants some rights to the client; and (5) the vendor 
completely own all IP assets, with the client taking a license through negotiations. For example, in an agreement 
between HSBC Holdings PLC and SoftGen International, SoftGen developed the CIMphony™ Computer 
Telephony Integration systems software and granted HSBC a perpetual, paid-up, non-exclusive, non-transferable 
license to use the software. Title to the software, further development of the software, and customized software 
developments were all owned by SoftGen. In addition to licensed use, the IP owner may allow the other party to 
                                                           
3
 An example of weak law enforcement was demonstrated in the case of Jolly Technologies, Inc. The company sued Mumbai (India) police for 
refusing to investigate the alleged theft of proprietary source code (George and Gaut 2006).  
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have the rights to modify or/and create derivatives from the licensed technology solely for its own use. Appendix A 
provides examples for each type of rights-sharing.  
 
Rights-sharing may not however, fully eliminate the risks of information poaching and misappropriation of trade 
secrets as these actions are generally difficult to detect and prove. A complementary mechanism to protect 
information confidentiality is through restrictive covenants on partners’ business activities through non-compete 
clauses. These clauses prohibit partners from using any type of trade secret, such as a proprietary design, new ideas 
for further development, or training/consulting materials developed in conjunction with the software program to 
client’s competitors during a period after the end of the contract. The restrictive covenants specified in the 
agreement enables firms to appeal to courts by alleging violation of the agreements against competition, even when 
detection of that violation is difficult. With this proclamation, a plaintiff can request a preliminary injunction to 
cease disclosure and unfair usage of its trade secret pending the outcome of litigation (Lanjouw and Lerner 2001). In 
addition, judges tend to be more conservative in protecting trade secrets than they would be in protecting other 
property because, once a trade secret is learned by others, it no longer is afforded protection under the law 
(Majewski and Williamson 2004). Normally companies specify restrictive covenants in non-compete clauses to 
prohibit a partner from contracting with a third party or to enjoin a partner from developing the same technology 
outside of the current contract. Consequently, the restriction helps companies in blocking competitors from direct or 
indirect competition for a limited period of years. The length of restrictive covenant is also a key point in 
negotiation. IP owners generally want an open period with no limits, whereas the other contract parties usually want 
a short period.  
 
Hypotheses 
Property rights theory argues that parties whose marginal effort has the greatest impact on project success should 
own the property assets, and at least one empirical study of ownership and control rights allocation in Internet portal 
alliances confirms this hypothesis (Elfenbein and Lerner 2003). In addition to the literature on property rights 
theory, empirical literature on transaction cost theory (Ordover 1991; Scotchmer 1991; Besen and Raskind 1991) 
suggest that the transaction characteristics pertaining to the contract (e.g., scope of technology transfer, the 
competitive stakes, etc.) and the legal (institutional) and relational environment of the agreement should determine 
the overall IP risk management strategy (Oxley 1997, 1999; Qui 2006). Although the empirical studies employing 
transaction cost theory focus on the question of “make-or-buy”, rather than the rights-sharing arrangements, it is 
conceivable that the TCE constructs can also play a role in IP risk management in the software development 
outsourcing context. In particular, we examine the effects of three transaction specific characteristics, namely the 
degree of software customization (Aron et al. 2005; Anand and Khanna 2000, Teece 2000), the extent of modularity 
in the software design (Sanchez and Mahoney 1996; Tiwana 2008) and overall strength of legal IP protection in the 
domicile of the contract (Oxley 1997; Qui 2006) on the IP risk management strategies used by firms.  
 
Software Customization  
 
Customized software development involves substantial exchange of firm specific information about proprietary 
business processes and product designs to enable vendors to design software to support these processes and 
products. For example, a client in the auto industry hired a specialized vendor to develop software for a customized 
vehicle suspension system but had to share precise design and performance specifications of the new product. Since 
the transfer of such information is irreversible (Anand and Khanna 2000; Teece 2000), disclosing this information to 
the client’s competitor or interested third parties could blunt the client’s business advantage (Aron et al. 2005). Prior 
work has demonstrated that the overall level and scope of contractual provisions tend to be higher in software 
projects that involve a high level of customization (Chen and Bharadwaj 2009; Brousseau and Coeurderoy 2005). 
Because it is impossible to foresee all potential IP risks (Anand and Khanna 2000; Feinstein and Stein 1988; Gallini 
and Trebilcock 1998), we argue that clients will try to incorporate more IP protection mechanisms aimed at 
deterring misappropriation and theft behavior. Such arrangements can take the form of incentives such as more 
rights sharing with the vendors as well as penalties that impose restrictions on further sharing or disclosure of 
proprietary information. Therefore,  
 
H1: Software customization is positively associated with (a) rights-sharing between clients and vendors; and (b) use 
of restrictive covenants in software contracts.  
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Modularity of Software  
 
Modularity in software systems refers to the degree of internal decoupling among constituent subsystems (Tiwana 
2008). As a software design strategy, modularity allows the client to provide only the minimum information needed 
by the vendor to design and develop the subsystem and its interface specifications without disclosing any additional 
information about the overall system with which it must eventually operate. Modularity thus reduces dependencies 
at the system-subsystem interface and lowers the need for additional exchanges of proprietary or sensitive 
information (Tiwana 2008). The independence engendered by modularity enables optimal partitioning of the 
development tasks, thereby reducing the risks of misappropriation of trade secrets (Stremersch et al. 2003). Under 
such circumstances, clients are likely to perceive design modularity as a buffer against IP risks and therefore less 
likely to incorporate contractual IP protection mechanisms which tend to be costlier to impose and implement. 
Therefore,  
 
H2: Modularity in software systems is negatively associated with (a) rights-sharing between clients and vendors; 
and (b) restrictive covenants in software contracts. 
 
Pricing Structure 
 
In outsourcing, pricing structure is often used to allocate costs and mitigate vendors’ moral hazard. Previous 
empirical studies of outsourcing contract structures posit that high risks of a project are more likely associated with 
flexible pricing such as time and material contracts or cost-plus contracts (Gopal et al. 2003). Inter-organizational 
relationship literature suggests that flexible pricing acts as an incentive to enhance motivation and accountability in 
buyer-supplier relationship. Hence, vendors should be rewarded for being creative and innovative in developing 
software or implementing initiatives that contribute to efficient business process or cost saving. Therefore, contract 
parties are prone to share both IP rights and future revenue when vendors’ efforts in software development will add 
great value to the developed software or software-supported business processes.  We hypothesize: 
  
H3: The flexibility of pricing is positively associated with rights-sharing between clients and vendors in software 
contracts. 
 
Strength of IP protection  
 
IP assets are generally governed by distinct national laws, which vary from one country to another, adding further 
complexity to managing IP assets in offshore outsourcing relationships. For companies that outsource software 
development to overseas vendors, the benefits of offshoring must outweigh the risks encountered across-borders, 
including the strength of intellectual property protection in that specific country. When legal infrastructure and law 
enforcement cannot effectively protect property rights, a company will either choose not to outsource or will rely 
more on private law mechanisms to protect their IP assets in outsourcing. Therefore, weak IP protection encourages 
outsourcing companies to use a “carrot and stick” approach. They are more likely to grant legal access and use rights 
for vendors in order to reduce the incentives for IP theft and information poaching. However, when IP protection is 
weak, companies are also more likely to impose more and longer restrictive covenants (Oxley 1997) in order to deter 
partners from misappropriation of IP assets and disclosure of confidential information. Therefore,  
 
H4: The strength of IP protection in the offshore location is negatively associated with (a) rights-sharing between 
clients and vendors; and (b) use of restrictive covenants in software contracts. 
Data Collection and Measures 
Data for the study comes from software development outsourcing agreements culled from the U.S. securities and 
exchange commission (SEC) augmented by information from annual reports (ICC full-text annual reports for 
international company profiles, and B-FIND U.S. and Canadian public and private company information). The SEC 
regulations require the disclosure of material contracts
4
 which are generally understood as “[a]ny contract upon 
                                                           
4
 A contract is material if “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in making an investment 
decision.” (explanation from SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R) 
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which the registrant’s business is substantially dependent, as in the case of … agreement[s] to use a patent, formula, 
trade secret, process or trade name.” Software development contracts are frequently included in the financial filings 
of companies registered in the US. We initially collected 215 software development and application development 
contracts, of which 62 were dropped due to substantial missing information, for an effective sample size of 153 
software development contracts spanning 9 industries. Of these, 108 agreements were with domestic vendors and the 
remaining 46 with foreign vendors across 14 countries
5
. Although the sample size of the dataset is relatively small, 
the frequency distribution of the sample across industries is similar to those of licensing agreements or alliance 
agreements which have been studied in prior literature (Oxley 1997; Kim 2004). The software development 
contracts were used to examine (1) rights-sharing: situation in which parties obtain IP rights to deliverables and 
derivatives that are client, vendor, or jointly owned by client and vendor; (2) restrictive covenant: non-compete and 
non-disclosure restrictions placed on the vendor’s business dealings with client’s competitors; (3) pricing structure: 
fixed pricing, or time and material and cost-plus; (4) revenue sharing, e.g., common stock exchange, per copy 
royalty fee, etc.; (5) task complexity: the total number of tasks/project specified in contracts; (6) exclusivity: restrict 
the vendor’s activity in developing the software solely for the client during the contract duration, the vendor shall 
not develop the same kind of software to other parties; and (7) contract duration.  We also collected data about prior 
business relationships between the contracting parties, vendor’s certification, and the client SIC industry 
designations from other financial filings and statements described earlier.  
Study Variables  
The study uses two dependent variables. Rights-sharing captured the extent of sharing of IP rights among 
contracting parties and was coded as 5: when the software IP rights were owned exclusively and solely by vendor 
and the client only has the normal license to use the software; as 4: the software deliverable is owned exclusively 
and solely by Vendor, but Client shares some rights of deliverable in addition to the usage license (e.g., reproduce 
software, make derivative, distribution right, marketing rights, etc); as 3: when the software IP rights were owned 
jointly by vendor and client, and both parties had full rights to the deliverable; and as 2: when the software 
deliverable is owned exclusively and solely by Client, but Vendor shares some rights of deliverable (e.g., reproduce 
software, make derivative, distribution right, marketing rights, etc); and as 1: software deliverable is owned 
exclusively and solely by Client and Vendor does not have any right of that deliverable (even license).  
 
The second dependent variable, restrictive covenant, was a dummy variable coded as 1 if the vendor was restricted 
in any of the following two business activities: (1) developing, producing, marketing or selling the same kind or type 
of technology being developed by the client for a period of time or (2) providing similar software development or 
consulting services for any business competitors of the client. Usually this kind of restriction is specified in non-
compete clauses or agreements.  
Independent variables  
The measure of the strength of IP protection used in the analysis was collected from Business Software Alliance 
(BSA) Annual Global Piracy Report. They report software piracy level for every country based on an examination 
of the difference between the quantity installed and the quantity legitimately acquired. The higher the piracy level, 
the weaker is the software copyright protection in that country. Customized software development was a binary 
variable measured as 1 if the outsourcing required customization for the client’s sole use and modularity, was coded 
as 1 if the software developed was a subcomponent of a larger system owned by the client, and 0 otherwise. Pricing 
structure was coded as 0 if the payment for software development is fixed amount. It was measured as 1 if the 
vendor was reimbursed by cost-plus method or based on time & material.  
Control variables  
Although the main hypotheses focus on the strength of IP protection, software customization, modularity, and 
pricing as the primary explanatory variables, other factors could potentially influence the decisions about rights 
allocation and activity restriction. The revenue sharing, scope of software development, exclusivity between vendor 
                                                           
5
 10 for Canada, 7 for Japan, 5 for U.K., 5 for India, and one for Israel, Australia, Bahamas, Netherlands, Hong Kong, Denmark, Switzerland, 
Luxumgburg, France, and Hungary. Nine industries include food, finance and banking, printing, chemicals, industrial machinery and equipment, 
petroleum and coal, electronic equipment, computer, and instruments and related products.  
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and client, contract duration (short-term vs. long-term contract), inter-firm collaborative history, the vendor’s 
certification, industry dummy, and onshore/offshore sourcing were included as controls to account for rival 
explanations. Since the sample timeframe extended from 1994 to 2006, we also included a time dummy to capture 
other unaccounted time-period effects by using the midpoint of the sampling time frame (year 2000) as a cut-off 
point. See Table 1 for a description of the variables and measurements. Table 2 provides the key summary statistics.  
Empirical Analysis and Results  
We begin by estimating IP rights-sharing and restrictive covenant as a function of the variables featured in our 
hypotheses, along with the relevant controls described above. Since rights-sharing is 5-scale number and restrictive 
covenant is dichotomous variable we use OLS and probit analysis for the estimation respectively. For the rights-
sharing, we also conduct a multinomial logit regression as a robust test. The client’s full ownership (coded as 1) is 
used as a base case. The Ward Test results demonstrate that customization, modularity are significant at p<0.05 with 
Rights-sharing which are consistent with the OLS analysis.  
 
Among the controls, exclusivity was associated positively with rights-sharing. Revenue sharing also associated with 
a lower level of rights-sharing suggesting that monetary reward may substitute the property sharing.  Interestingly, 
year dummy is positively associated with rights-sharing and restrictive covenants. It demonstrates that software 
development contracts signed after Year 2000 are more likely to use IP rights-sharing as an incentive mechanism to 
reduce the IP misappropriation opportunism. Industry dummy is positively associated with rights-sharing suggesting 
that clients in the computing and software industry are concern about the IP risks and prone to share rights between 
parties. Offshoring contracts are less likely to include restrictive covenant as a control mechanism for the IP 
misappropriation. It reflects the uncertainty about the effectiveness of legal validity and enforcement of restrictive 
covenants across country board.  
 
As posited, we find the customized software development to be positively associated with rights-sharing and 
restrictive covenant, fully supporting hypothesis H1. Opposite to our predictions in H2, the results demonstrate that 
modularity had positively impact on rights-sharing and restrictive covenant. One possible explanation to this 
counter-intuitive finding is that it is easier for vendors to reuse or modify the designed modular but with less 
misappropriation risks. Both clients and vendors may want to share the rights and benefit if vendors can redeploy the 
developed modular in other software development projects. Supporting H4, the strength of IP protection was 
negatively associated with the level of restrictive covenants, however, not significant with Rights-sharing. When the 
level of the IP legislation and legal enforcement is high, firms are more likely to trust the legal systems to enforce IP 
protection. However, we didn’t find support for H3, that is, pricing structure is not significant to the decision of 
rights-sharing and restrictive covenant.   
Discussion  
This study is among the first in IS to empirically examine both outsourcing and offshoring software development 
contracts to better understand how IP risk reduction strategies have been implemented to prevent misappropriation 
of trade secrets. It delineates contractual risk reduction mechanisms, namely rights-sharing and restrictive covenants, 
and predicts the key factors affecting IP risks management strategies. From this perspective, the study provides 
useful guideline to companies and legal practitioners and helps them understand IP risk- reduction strategies in 
outsourcing and especially in offshore contracts where the danger of IP loss and misappropriation rises significantly.  
 
The study presents some interesting results. First, the positive association between software customization and IP 
rights sharing shows that clients recognize the likelihood of information misappropriation during the development 
and therefore use rights-sharing mechanisms as incentives to protect against misappropriations. However, clients 
also see the possibility that vendors reuse the information gained from the contract to develop same kind of software 
for the client’s competitors. They will tend to protect it aggressively through the imposition of restrictive covenants 
in order to restrict the vendor’s activities after the end of the contract. Second, the positive relationship between 
software modularity and IP rights-sharing suggests an ignored effect of modularity, that is modularity increases the 
reusability of the developed software and in turn enhances the contractual parties’ rights-sharing propensity. Finally, 
the negative association between revenue sharing and IP rights-sharing shows that benefit sharing acts as a substitute 
of the risk management strategy for IP misappropriation protection. The associations between the strength of IP 
protection (piracy control level in the country) and restrictive covenants demonstrate that when legal infrastructure 
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and law enforcement are effective safeguards, firms will rely on the legal IP systems to protect against the risks of 
negative knowledge-spillover and misappropriation of trade secrets and they don’t see the necessity to invest efforts 
in negotiating the restrictive covenants in the contracts. The finding is consistent with the legal relationship between 
contract law and IP law.  
Limitation and Future Research  
Although the hypotheses tested were generally consistent with the developed theory, the study suffers from a few 
limitations. First, since public firms are required to file only “material contracts,” the sample is likely biased toward 
the larger IT outsourcing contracts that the firms voluntarily chose to disclose. Second, the study is restricted by the 
availability of secondary data. Additional firm-specific characteristics such as outsourcing and negotiation 
experience are possible additional explanators of IP risk management strategies and could be included in the model. 
Third, richer measures of some of the variables, such as customized development and modularity, are likely to yield 
more insightful results about the differential effects on right-sharing and restrictive covenant. Finally, the study only 
analyzed three rights-sharing structures. However, IP rights can be divided into many different kinds of rights such 
as use rights, license rights, modification rights, derivative rights, etc. Studying these individual rights-sharing 
agreements in a software development context will enrich our understanding of the property rights of intangible 
assets.  
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Table 1 Explanatory and Dependent Variable Descriptions 
Variable Description  Measurement 
Customized 
development 
A proxy of asset 
specificity 
Binary code (0/1) 
=1, if contract requires vendor to customized technologies/products; otherwise, =0 
Modularity  Binary code (0/1) 
=1, if outsourced software project is a subcomponent of an integrated system and it is not require to be developed 
using client’s development tools; otherwise, =0 
Pricing 
structure 
 Binary code (0/1) 
=0, if it is a fixed-cost price contract  
=1, if it is a cost-plus contract or time & material contract 
Piracy Control Strength of IP 
protection in countries 
Nominal data collected from Business Software Alliance (BSA) Global Software Piracy Study. The data is 
available from 1994-now. The higher the piracy level, the lower the IP protection.  
Prior 
interaction 
 
Control variable  Binary (0/1).  
=1, if the parties were involved in any business interaction including: (a) equity interest relationship: 
subsidiary/spun-off; (b) there is common board membership; (c) other lines of business. =0, otherwise 
Exclusivity Control variable Binary (0/1).  
=1, if the vendor develops this software solely for the client and during the contract duration, the vendor shall not 
develop the same kind of software to other parties; otherwise =0. 
Revenue 
Sharing 
Control variable Binary (0/1).  
=1, if client will share revenue with vendor after employing the developed software, otherwise =0.  
Vendor’s 
Certification 
Control variable  Binary (0/1) 
=1, if vendor has any of the following certificate: CMM/CMMI, ISO 9001, Six Sigma, COPC-2000, and SAS 70, 
otherwise =0 
Task 
complexity 
Control variable  The total number of tasks/projects outsourced, measuring the complexity of software development 
Contract 
Duration 
Control variable Binary (0/1) 
=1, if the contract duration is >12 months, otherwise, =0. 
Year dummy Control variable Binary code (0/1) 
=1, if the contract was signed after Year 2000; 
=0, if the contract was signed before or at Year 2000 
Offshore 
dummy 
Control variable 
 
Binary code (0/1) 
=1, if the software/application is developed outside of US; =0, if the software/application is developed in US 
Industry 
dummy 
Control variable Binary code (0/1) 
=1, if the client industry SIC code =73; otherwise =0. 
Rights-sharing Dependent variable 5-scale number 
=5, if the software deliverable is owned exclusively and solely by Vendor and Client does not have any right of 
that deliverable except the normal license to use; 
=4, if the software deliverable is owned exclusively and solely by Vendor, but Client shares some rights of 
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deliverable in addition to the usage license (e.g., reproduce software, make derivative, distribution right, 
marketing rights, etc) 
=3, if the software deliverable is owned jointly by vendor and client. That is, both parties have full rights of that 
deliverable. 
=2, if the software deliverable is owned exclusively and solely by Client, but Vendor shares some rights of 
deliverable (e.g., reproduce software, make derivative, distribution right, marketing rights, etc) 
=1, if software deliverable is owned exclusively and solely by Client and Vendor does not have any right of that 
deliverable. 
Restrictive 
covenant 
Dependent variable – 
vendor business 
restriction 
Binary code (0/1) 
=1, if the vendor is restricted to provide similar software development services to the client’s competitors and the 
vendor should not compete with the client; =0, if there is no such restriction 
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Table 2 Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Variable Scale Mean 
(Std) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1.Customized 
development 
Binary 0.63 
(0.48) 
1.00              
2. Modularity Binary 0.48 
(0.37) 
0.29 
 
1.00             
3.Pricing 
Structure 
Binary 0.20 
(0.40) 
0.11 
 
0.04 1.00            
4.Piracy 
Control 
Nominal 0.33 
(0.15) 
-0.01 -0.07 0.12 1.00           
5.Prior 
Interaction 
Binary 0.23 
(0.42) 
0.03 0.03 0.07 0.10 1.00          
6. Exclusivity Binary 0.64 
(0.48) 
-0.14 0-0.11 0.07 0.03 0.02 1.00         
7.Revenue 
Sharing 
Binary 0.24 
(0.43) 
0.11 0.21 -0.13 -0.11 0.02 -0.12 1.00        
8.Vendor’s 
Certification 
Binary 0.35 
(0.47) 
0.08 0.07 0.07 0.26 0.05 -0.10 -0.00 1.00       
9.Task 
Complexity 
6-scale 2.33 
(1.44) 
-0.04 -0.15 0.16 0.03 -0.10 -0.16 -0.06 -0.05 1.00      
10.Contract 
Duration 
Binary 0.35 
(0.48) 
-0.10 -0.12 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.06 -0.06 0.01 0.08 1.00     
11.Year 
Dummy 
Binary 0.48 
(0.51) 
0.20 0.14 -0.03 0.12 -0.05 0.01 0.01 0.14 -0.01 -0.01 1.00    
12.Offshore 
Dummy 
Binary 0.29 
(0.45) 
-0.06 0.01 0.11 0.67 0.06 0.02 -0.09 0.35 -0.01 -0.01 0.23 1.00   
13.Industry 
Dummy 
Binary 0.31 
(0.47) 
0.08 -0.04 0.01 0.28 0.00 0.04 -0.02 0.12 0.09 -0.05 0.00 0.16 1.00  
14.Rights-
sharing 
5-scale 3.58 
(1.46) 
0.55 0.44 0.16 0.07 -0.03 0.08 -0.02 0.07 -0.10 -0.08 0.36 0.05 0.15 1.00 
15.Restrictive 
covenant 
Binary 0.24 
(0.43) 
0.26 0.16 0.10 0.13 -0.04 -0.03 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.26 -0.01 0.02 0.26 
Note: n=153, bolded correlations are significant at p>0.05 level.  
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Table 3:  Data Analysis Results 
Variables  (1) 
             OLS 
(2) 
Probit 
 Rights-Sharing Restrict Covenant 
Customized software 
development 
1.29*** 
(0.20) 
0.73** 
(0.32) 
Modularity 1.32*** 
(0.25) 
0.86* 
(0.51) 
Pricing Structure 0.31 
(0.22) 
0.34 
(0.32) 
Piracy Control 0.45 
(0.,82) 
3.71*** 
(1.22) 
Prior Relationship -0.16 
(0.21) 
-0.20 
(0.31) 
Exclusive Relationship 0.45** 
(0.19) 
-0.04 
(0.27) 
Revenue Sharing -0.35* 
(0.21) 
0.30 
(0.28) 
Vendor Certification -0.06 
(0.20) 
0.03 
(0.28) 
Task Complexity -0.07 
(0.17) 
0.11 
(0.10) 
Contract Duration -0.01 
(0.18) 
0.27 
(0.26) 
Year Dummy 0.67*** 
(0.18) 
0.74*** 
(0.26) 
Offshore Dummy -0.13 
(0.27) 
-1.17** 
(0.48) 
Industry Dummy 0.38* 
(0.20) 
-0.20 
(0.29) 
n 153 153 
Log likelihood  -65.77 
R-square or Pseudo R-
square 
0.51 0.21 
                                  Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix A Coding Protocol 
Variables Description Examples 
Customized 
Software 
Development 
A software designed & developed to fulfill the specific 
requirement of a company’s use is called a customized 
software and the procedure of developing specially 
tailored for specific needs is called customized software 
development 
 
Example 1: SoftGen agrees to develop and supply to HSBC customized software 
developments and any changes and additions which may be necessary to the 
software according to the HSBC specifications given in Schedule 5 (herinafter the 
"Customised Software Developments") at the prices agreed with HSBC given in 
Schedule 1.…… 
Customized Software developments refer to HSBC customized composite GUI 
Swipe Card   
  Example 2: in [Corporate Systems Ltd. And Hartford Fire Insurance Company] 
CS will install CS's proprietary software as well as software developed by CS for 
Hartford on computers in the CS Computer Facility…… 
CS agrees to provide Development Services, at Hartford's cost as specified in 
Schedule O, developing for Hartford the following types of Custom 
Programming: (i) software to enhance or modify the MCM System which will be 
integrated with the MCM System ("Integrated Customizations"); and (ii) stand-
alone software ("Stand-Alone Customizations").  Said Development Services shall 
include, but not be limited to, consulting in identifying 
Customizations to meet Hartford's needs, software development and 
implementation activities with respect to such identified Customizations, and 
software to meet Hartford reporting needs.  
5.2 Hartford shall provide CS with Hartford's user requirement specifications for 
the Custom Programming which shall be included as part of Schedule B. …… 
 Not customized software [Scanvec Amiable, Inc. and Hewlett-Packard Company] Apple plans to release its 
most recent operating system, Mac OS X, in Spring 2001. HP would like to make 
all its devices simultaneously compatible with the release of OS X. To comply 
with this corporate directive and to increase the competitiveness of its product 
line, ICD requests that SA update TCD's existing Macintosh drivers. 
The project will focus on Building a macro installer which automatically detects 
the HOS and language while prompting for the printer model.  
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Modular 
design 
Modular software design means that, instead of having 
a large collection of statements strung together in one 
partition of in-line code, we segment or divide the 
statements into logical groups called modules. Each 
module performs one or two tasks, then passes control 
to another module.  
[FLO Corporation and International RAM Associates, Inc] RAM shall develop the 
technical design for the Application Software (the " System Design Specification 
") in consultation with FLO and using the Agile process and other development 
tools described in Exhibit 2 (Development Tools)…… 
"Application Software" means, collectively, the FLO Facility Server Application, 
FLO Authentication Application and any other software module, component, 
routine or source code developed by RAM hereunder. 
" FLO Authentication Application " means the software subsystems, systems 
components and applications executing on FLO kiosks and authentication 
hardware configuration necessary to provide authentication and processing of 
FLO subscribers at security checkpoints. 
" FLO Facility Server Application " means the software subsystems, systems 
components and applications necessary to provide the operational functionality 
supporting FLO RT operations at airports and enrollment facilities. 
 Not modularized [CommunicateNow.com, Inc. and JCL Associates Inc.] The parties wish to 
develop a software applications package to be run on the “Equipment” for use in 
business establishments. …… 
Both parties have services, monies, knowledge, expertise, and equipment that is 
necessary to combine their efforts to develop a useful software program for 
businesses.  
Right 
Allocation 
Mode 
=1,  
Client owns the sole property of ownership 
[PrintOnTheNet.com, Inc., and Ducat Commerce, LLC] Developer agrees that the 
development of the “printing related work” of the Software is “work made for 
hire” within the meaning of the Copyright Act of 1976, as amended, and that the 
Software shall be the sole property of Buyer. 
 =2, 
Client owns the ownership of proprietary technology, 
but grant vendor some rights 
 
A. Use right: Non-exclusive license 
Title to the Operating Programs, Further Operating Programs, Customised 
Software Developments and Further Customised Software Developments shall 
remain with SoftGen. SoftGen agrees to grant to HSBC a perpetual, paid-up, non-
exclusive, non-transferable license to use the Operating Programs, Further 
Operating Programs, Customised Software Developments and Further Customised 
Software Developments listed in Schedules 1 and 2 as may be amended from time 
to time provided that the appropriate software license payments, software 
development charges and/or Software Maintenance payments as listed in 
Schedules 1 to 4 have been paid previously by HSBC to SoftGen. 
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 B. Patent application right [Hawaiian Telecom and Accenture] Residuals Clause. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing or anything herein to the contrary, nothing herein shall prohibit either 
Party from using general ideas, skills, knowledge, experience, concepts and know-
how learned in connection with this Agreement that are retained in unaided 
memory of its employees (provided they have not been intentionally memorized 
for the purpose of relying on this provision), provided that such use does not 
infringe the other Party's copyrights and does not misappropriate the other Party's 
trade secrets. Where (i) a Deliverable embodies an invention for which Hawaiian 
Telcom seeks patent protection, and a patent claiming such invention issues for 
which any Accenture Personnel are inventors, or (ii) any modification to or 
derivative work of an Accenture Technical Element made by or on behalf of 
Hawaiian Telcom embodies an invention for which Hawaiian Telcom seeks patent 
protection , and a patent claiming such invention issues , and, to the extent that 
such derivative work is software or software code, the underlying Accenture 
Technical Element contributes a material portion of the derivative work, then in 
each of the cases of subsections (i) and (ii), Hawaiian Telcom agrees not sue 
Accenture for infringement of such patent as a result Accenture exercising its 
rights under this Section 12.2 . 
 =3, 
Joint ownership  
[U S West Communications, Inc. and OneLink Communications, Inc] In the 
course of or as a result of performance under this agreement, inventions, 
discoveries, adaptations, ideas, specifications, functional requirements, business 
and technical information, computer or other apparatus programs, software, 
copyrightable material, documentation, trade secrets, trademarks, and other ideas, 
knowledge or data,… unless specified otherwise in this agreement, all such 
intellectual property shall belong jointly to both Parties. 
 =4, 
Vendor owns the ownership of proprietary technology, 
but grant client exclusive use right 
[Tribune and AdStar] 6.1. Ownership Rights. All intellectual property rights in 
and to the CareerBuilder Service created prior to or during the Term, including all 
Enhancements, are solely and exclusively owned by AdStar (the Vendor)… 
3.1. License Grant: Scope: (a) AdStar hereby grants to Tribune and its Affiliates 
an exclusive (even as against AdStar), perpectual, irrevocable, sublicensable (but 
only to Affilates of Tribune or members of the CareerBuilder Network), 
worldwide, transferable (but only to Affilates of Tribune or members of the 
CareerBuilder Network) and present right and license to make, have made, use, 
reproduce, display, modify, transmit and otherwise exploit for the purposes of this 
Agreement and the First Agreement, the Modules and Enhancement and Upgrades 
or other modifications thereto. The parties hereby acknowledge and agree that the 
computer code written  for the Modules, may not be used by AdStar to create 
software for any third party…. 
3.2. Further Licenses. AdStar may grant directly to Affiliates of Tribune or 
members of the CareerBuilder Network or to third parties the non-exclusive right 
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to use the CareerBuilder Service solely as approved by Tribune and solely in 
connection with products or platforms developed by CareerBuilder or any other 
product or platform approved by Tribune.  
3.3. No Restrictions. Notwithstanding any contrary provision contained herein, the 
Parties understand and agree that nothing contained in this Agreement is intented 
to, and therefore nothing does, limit or impose any restriction upon AdStar’s 
ability to contract with, develop software relating to or provide services (including 
the CareerBuilder Service) to Gannett, Knight Ridder or any of their affiliates.  
 =5,  
Vendor owns the ownership of proprietary technology, 
Client has only use license 
[ Connet, Inc and Fulcrum Technologies Inc] 2. Grant: Licensor grants Licensee: a 
non-exclusive, non-transferable right in the Territory for one developer to use 
each copy of a SearchServer SDK in the version specified… 
Restrictive 
Covenant 
=1 During the term of this Agreement and for a period of 12 months after the 
termination of the Developer's consulting service, the Developer will not, either 
directly or indirectly, be interested or concerned (whether as a proprietor, partner, 
member, shareholder, director, officer, agent, consultant or otherwise) in any 
person, firm, company or business engaged in or interested in or concerned in any 
business which develops, manufactures, produces, provides, markets, distributes 
or otherwise deals in products or services or both which are of a type similar to the 
products or services which are developed, manufactured, produced, provided, 
marketed, distributed or otherwise dealt in by the Company now or at any time 
during the term of the Developer's consulting services. Such restriction will apply 
within the geographical area of business operations in which the Company has an 
office and carries on business or has carried on business within the 12 month 
period ending on the date of termination of the Developer's service. Such 
restriction will not prevent the Developer from being the holder or beneficial 
owner of any shares of any class of publicly held securities of a company, 
partnership or other organization provided that the Developer, alone or in 
partnership or in conjunction with any other person or company, does not own 
directly or indirectly more than five percent of the securities of such class. 
 
